

УДК 330.3

JEL O57

DOI <https://doi.org/10.17721/tppe.2022.44.18>

Bülent AÇMA, Prof. Dr., Anadolu University,
Faculty of Economics, Chair of Economy Department

Tekang P. Kwachuh, PhD Candidate, Anadolu University,
Department of Political Science and International Relations

CHINA'S EXPANSIONISM BEYOND ASIA: THE QUEST FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND MARKETS IN AFRICA. THE CASE OF CAMEROON.

The end of the wars and the cold war signaled a new dimension and the birth of new and secondary actors in the international scene. China is one such newcomer in the lamp-light in 21st Century whose relations with the African Continent have grown by leaps and bounds. Chinese Foreign Policy blueprints are enforced by mutual cooperation among developing states beyond Asia, and its emerging superpower status is on the rise. The Beijing Declaration in the year 2000 was colossally accompanied by China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the realm of economic and social development. The quest for raw materials, energy resources, and markets to feed the burgeoning Chinese industries has pushed China into a mad rush in Africa and Cameroon in particular. This work investigates the reasons responsible for Chinese interest in Africa with special a focus on Cameroon. Also, it makes an appraisal of the socio-economic impact accruing from Sino-Cameroon ties, and lastly, the paper looks at the challenges China faces in Cameroon in keeping her economic interest buoyantly. The World System's theory whose analysis centers on the relations between the core and periphery is utilized here. The deepening and asymmetric imbalances in this relation in favor of China have triggered debates within and without the continent in the academia and policymakers with some viewing China as a neocolonial state in disguise in line with other capitalist states since the "win-win" economic sermon preached by China is a farce with China gaining fatly.

Keywords: Africa, Asia, China, Cameroon, Expansionism, Natural Resources, and Markets.



Fig. 1.1 Map showing the One China Silk Belt Road Policy on the Way.

Introduction. As the African States and Cameroon began enjoying the fruits of independence. African states found themselves in the arms of lucrative and juicy “win-win” and “mutual benefits” preached by Beijing on a socio-economic pulpit thereby culminating to the Beijing Consensus and FOCAC. Adem (2010: 352) ruthlessly question basic assumptions of China-Africa policy, suggesting that the notion of “China in Africa is inaccurate to an extent for China does not deal with Africa per se, but with individual African countries and the total of China’s relations with African countries is not the same as China’s relations with Africa.”. It is in this light that Sino-Cameroon relations should be espoused to have a grasp via Chinese expansionism beyond Asia.

Chinese involvement in Africa can be traced historically as far back as 618 A.D., which has stood out to be a salient and unique advantage for the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to date. China’s moves into the African continent have been divided into three historical epochs. The first advent of this historical footstep by China lies in the era leading up to 1949 which was baptized as the episodic phase where, The T’ang (618-907 A.D.), Sung, and Ming dynasties traded in tusks, horns, slaves, and light-manufactured goods, respectively. As the 19th Century drew to a close, the very first contingent of Chinese immigrants made their way to Africa, especially during the post-Boxer rebellion in 1899. The second mass influx of Chinese immigrants got into the African Continent after the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

The second pivotal period was known as the ideological period baptized as the

“symbolic phase” which can be traced from 1960 until 1989. Other remarkable episodes of this period were metamorphosed by Tan Zam railway (1970-1976) construction, China’s replacement of Taiwan at the UN Security Council in 1971 backed by overwhelming African support, and the definition of the principles of “Mutual Respect and Non-interference” by Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1982.

The third period started in the 1990s and evolves to date. Michel and Beuret (2009 :118), stated that from the 1990s onward, more and more Chinese have also traveled to Africa in search of fortunes, seeing the continent as “a dream destination” rich in oil, gas, and gold, and also sparsely populated with much available land. Khan and Baye (2008: 6) reported that President Paul Biya in his speech in 2007 hilariously encouraged Chinese companies to “come in their numbers and invest in Cameroon”. This phase is distinguished by the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the refurbishment of State-Owned Enterprises, and the expansionism of the “Socialist Market Economy.” China transformed itself from an oil exporter to an oil importer, and China’s accession of markets in Africa began from 1996. Apparently, the “Third Wave” of Chinese immigrants are enroute to Africa in their numbers taking part in beefing up Chinese global leadership and hegemonic quest in different sectors.

Within the year 1978, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders took a U-turn from the traditional Maoism policy in which China has been operating. With the dumping of Maoism, Deng and his peers spearheaded the introduction of sweeping market-based economic reforms which were geared at opening China’s economy and foreign investments to the outside world. On a stronger note, the main parameter for this economic reformation was tailored at finetuning the country’s political regime whose 20 years in leadership had become stalled, obsolete, and had been jeopardized by Maoist excesses. These leaders held firmly that the integration of China into the global economy could be catapulted by the evolutionary sermons of globalization that will culminate in the country’s modernization drive, fast-forward economic development, and better off living standards of the Chinese. Understanding the historicity of China in Africa is essential vital since it forms a backbone of Chinese transformational identity in Africa as another southern state which laid down the footing for their calculated strategy of “mutual benefits,” and non-interference in sovereign issues.

Sino-Cameroon relations have been marked by numerous high-level visits by top-ranking officials from both states. The visit by a Cameroon official to China took place in August 1972 and the first visit by a Chinese official to Cameroon was in 1978. Is from here that both states started becoming very close and cooperating through the signing of diplomatic and trade deals. This relationship has pros and cons on both sides.

Diplomatic ententes are usually established between any two states with the primary aim of mutual benefits to both states. Over 50 years plus have gone-by, the diplomatic relations between China and the African continent have grown by leaps and bounds especially the relations with Cameroon. The relationship between China and Cameroon has culminated in huge benefits for both states thereby acting as a haven for China especially in terms of trade and the extraction of raw materials. In return, China has made enormous contributions in the economic, military and socio-cultural domains. Contrary to

the ideal on mutual benefits posits reaped by both parties, it is evident that from facts and statistics the situation does not match. Africa and Cameroon have a huge reserve of natural resources, plenty of raw materials alongside a ready market for Chinese goods.

The first section of this paper hangs on the problem that is motivating Chinese expansionism beyond Asia and its mad rush for a relation with the African continent, particularly with Cameroon. Section two of the paper makes an appraisal of the socio-economic impact accruing from Sino-Cameroon ties on Cameroon and lastly, the paper looks at the challenges

Hypothetically, deducing from the questions and statement above of the problem of this work and the above, the guidelines for this work are provided by these three hypothetical points.

The industrial quest for raw materials to ensure a steady supply to feed Chinese industries is responsible for her expansionism beyond Asia.

A handful of socio-economic projects can be cited as evidence of Chinese contributions to Cameroon's 2035 development Vision




Fig 1.2. Map of Africa and the States alongside the different Natural Resources and Raw Materials.

Africa is home to five of the world's top oil-producing countries, with an estimated 57 percent of Africa's export earnings from hydrocarbons.

Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia, and Mozambique are all rich in oil and gas.

Proven oil reserves have grown by almost 150 percent, increasing from 53.4 billion barrels since 1980, to 130.3 billion barrels by the end of 2012.

The region is home to five of the top 30 oil-producing countries in the world, and nearly \$2tn of investments are expected by 2036.

Other resources

Besides oil and gas, Africa is rich in precious minerals, forests and: Diamonds (Angola,

Botswana, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo). Gold (Benin, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Mali, South Africa, Tanzania). Nickel and Uranium (Burundi). Pozzolana (Cape Verde). Fish (Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles). Timber (Liberia). Titanium (Gambia). Graphite (Madagascar). Tobacco (Malawi). Iron Ore (Mauritania). Phosphates (Western Sahara, Morocco). Aluminum and Gas (Guinea, Mozambique). Cooper (Uganda, Zambia) (Source: Aljazeera 2016).

Literature Review. Within the last twenty years, contemporary observers and scholars alike have produced voluminous work on China's policy toward Africa with an emphasis on the continent's mineral- and oil-rich nations. The bulk of the literature falls into two categories: those produced by "optimists" and those produced by "pessimists" (Adem 2010; Shinn & Eisenman 2012 as cited by Amin, 2015: 2). The intensity in the dimensions of finance and economy in the relation between China and Africa since the end of the 1990s has generated a debate whether it is balanced in the case of the least industrialized countries found in Africa. The product of this type of relationship has generated the terminology of Neo-colonialism or Neo-imperialism and has been a key subject of study for scholars (Lumumba, 201: 234-235 as cited by Karlsson, 2020: 6). China's economic engagement, they continue, has contributed to Africa's development. Pessimists argue that China's economic policy in Africa is predicated on the extraction of oil, minerals, and other raw materials, and on securing markets for "cheap" manufactured goods, and that its policies have contributed to pollution, the decimation of forest land, destruction of emerging industries, and unemployment (Amin, 2015: 2).

Cameroon and China established diplomatic ties on the 26th of March, 1971 in the wake of putting an end to its relationship with Taiwan (Khan and Baye, 2008). Since the establishment of diplomatic ties, these two nations embraced official economic and cultural collaboration. China being a country that experienced fast economic growth after the 1980s, presented a new, reliable, sustainable, and efficient alternative for underdeveloped countries like Cameroon (Zafar, 2007). The turning point in the Cameroon-China relations was the first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing in 2000. Since then, bilateral trade and economic cooperation projects have rapidly increased and China's presence in Cameroon has substantially enlarged and diversified (Cabestan, 2015). China's presence in Africa is growing, and its growing commitment to economic development through "south-south" cooperation is bringing far-reaching changes to the daily lives of African people, but also huge impacts both in terms of environmental rather than economic (over-indebtedness). The literature on economic cooperation between China and Africa is very varied, but with particular reference to Cameroon, very little has been said (Vanessa et al., 2019: 4).

The period after the cold war, when observers would invariably name France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as the only foreign powers to have substantial interests in Sub-Saharan Africa is drawing to a close (Shively, 2005: 394). No country can therefore ignore Beijing's ego in playing a global role. This is evident in the Chinese ever-increasing desire to capture natural resources and markets meant for her economic strength beyond her geographical sphere of influence, pursuing other victories on the

international arena which are political and economic and socio-cultural in nature.

Natural resources of countries are expected to contribute to their economic, social and political development and natural resources can be regarded as assets for economic development thus the economic development can constitute a base for political development. In the case of industrialized Western democracies such as the countries of the European Union and the United States, economic and political development has been taking place hand in hand. Accordingly, the expectation for the industrializing countries has been developed along these lines: The ones with greater natural resources are expected to develop faster (Breuning and Ishiyama, 2011: 393). Over the course of the past decades, the People's Republic of China has established itself as an increasingly influential player across the continent of Africa. Given the impressive scale and scope of her engagement, China's return to Africa may turn out to be one of the most significant developments for Africa in recent years (Alden, 2006: 155). China's increasing involvement in the African Continent is a manifestation of the remarkable transformation of the country's foreign policy over the past decade. Although most scholars interested in developments in Chinese affairs still debate on the nature and scope of that change, they mostly come to a consensus on the fact that China has been seeking a more active role in the international system (Medeiros and Taylor, 2003: 23). China's sudden repositioning of herself in the international scene is based on the evolutionary patterns of globalization and increased multilateralism which she sees as an opportunity to fine-tune, reshape her dogma and fit appropriately within the changing dynamics of globalization.

According to Etienne (2008: 2) as cited by (Bianco, 1997: 342) in relation to China's outsourcing of resources and markets states that underlying the desire for economic reform were two main factors. First, there were internal factors related to the will of the Chinese Communist Party elite to retain privileges and power as well as to rebuild legitimacy in the wake of such failures as the Hundred Flowers Campaign, The Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution, which brought decades of economic hardships. Second, external factors were arising from new international standards and a new international situation characterized by interdependencies and cooperation. This situation made economic development more difficult than ever for a country that remained outside the global economy.

The path chosen by post-Maoist China had a profound effect on Beijing's foreign policy. The regime made sustained economic development a sine qua non of the Communist Party's political legitimacy, and the very survival of the regime depends on its ability to ensure and maintain such development. Chinese leaders have never hesitated to use their foreign policy to find markets for their burgeoning export production and to secure access for China to much-needed raw materials (Truffaut, 2007). Starting in 2003, under Hu Jintao, China's foreign policy has been based on the doctrine of "fu zeren de daguo waijiao", or the diplomacy of a responsible great power which prescribes the importance of taking initiatives on issues of cooperation and multilateralism (Chung, 2004: 3-4).

Obiorah (2007: 42) The holding of the Bandung Conference in 1955 which acted as a catalyst for the decolonization of colonized people across the globe automatically signaled South-South tidings in which China was going to be the "Head Boy" in the long run. In

attendance were 29 Asian and African states viewed in nurturing economic and cultural ties allying both continents. The topics that were on the agenda included colonialism, imperialism and the hegemonic position of the Western powers. According to Wright:

In the course of the conference, China and the African states brainstormed on these five principles of 'Peaceful Coexistence' that took the rostrum during China-India diplomatic rapprochement. These five principles rested on; (1) Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) Mutual non-aggression; (3) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) Equality and mutual benefit; and (5) Peaceful coexistence. Between 1966 to 1969, Chinese focus in line with Africa was distracted because of internal squabbles accompanied by the outburst of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution. Upon the handling of China's internal quagmires, China was on a rampage in instituting new diplomatic ententes on the African continent which is still ongoing today in all spheres. According to China, the purpose of the China-African Forum was 'the construction of an international political and economic order and to explore new China-African cooperation' (Alden, 2005: 64).

In 2003, the second China-Africa Cooperation Forum was held in Addis Ababa when Prime Minister Wen Jiabao declared that foreign assistance and investment "comes with the deepest sincerity and without any political conditionalities". So far, there have been three high levels FOCAC gatherings. The first was held in Beijing in 2000, the second in Johannesburg in 2015, and most recently the third took place in 2018. At the 2018 FOCAC forum, Shannon (2018: 1), held that while the tone of official remarks at FOCAC was relentlessly positive, the topics discussed were inevitably shaped by these debates—and, more precisely, China's attempt to change the narrative. In his speech at the opening ceremony, Xi highlighted eight major initiatives for future China-Africa cooperation: industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, green development, capacity building, health care, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security. The common thread throughout all eight areas is an expanded focus on building up local capacity. China pledged, for example, to help boost agricultural productivity, increase imports especially of "non-resource products" from Africa, and provide vocational training through Luban Workshops, government scholarships, and exchange programs.

Nanje Ule (2013), espoused that three main reasons could clarify China's presence in Africa: (1) access to natural resources, such as oil and gas; (2) extending Chinese export market and fortifying China's diplomatic support for various organizations; (3) developing its economic growth and political influence. Despite the great difference in economic structure, Cameroon has a great deal to offer China as far as natural resources and market for manufactured products are concerned (Khan, and Baye, 2008). As Cameroon feeds Chinese industries with raw materials, China offers lucrative aid and huge loans for infrastructural expansion to Cameroon. In the infancy era of Sino-Cameroon relations, the 1990s witnessed a handful of gigantic projects at emblematic and catchy sites such as the construction of the Unity Palace (Presidency), National Congress Hall in French Palais des Congrès in Yaounde, the Lagdo dam in Cameroon's northern region and other eclectic projects were financed at \$75 million Chinese loans. According to Yun Sun (2018), China's last FOCAC meeting circulated on two agendas. The first agenda regards China's political

interests in consolidating the African continents support for China's international agenda. Secondly, there are internal interests between China and Africa that regards the deepening development of Africa's capacity building. Sun highlights that the reason for these internal interests lies in China's soft power campaign to promote Chinese models of political and economic development within these developing countries.




Fig 1.3. Map of Cameroon Showing Natural Resources

Methodology. The following methods were used in the research process: analysis and synthesis, comparative, induction and deduction, scientific abstraction, historical and logical generalizations in the analysis of scientific literature. The article makes use of secondary data which were gotten from both published and unpublished sources emanating from books, articles, news websites etc. Also, recent debates picking on Chinese global emergence as an economic giant and its continuous footprints in Cameroon and Africa were reviewed in this article alongside the world system theory plus the significant historical synthesis that cements Sino-Cameroon relations were mapped out as well in this article. Thus, this article pins on qualitative data via content analysis that were used to placidly cement the article for a better comprehension of Chinese in Cameroon which is growing.

Theoretical Framework. There exist a plethora of theories which can be used in analyzing this paper and it could take the form of south-south theories, global politics of resources and rentierism theories among others, however, the world-system theory propounded by Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s was adopted as the theoretical lens for this paper since China has worn the capitalist suit but pretending to be operating on a win-

win operandum. The proponents of this theory held that the position of the state could broadly rest on legal, economic and political framework in conducting her relations involving other states at different developmental phases.

The world-systems theory, propagated by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, is an appeal to the history of the world and social change that explains the existence of a world economic system wherein some countries benefit through the exploitation of other states. This theory cements on the social structure of global inequality. For Wallerstein, "a world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a lifespan over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others life within it is largely self-contained, and the dynamics of its development are largely internal" (Wallerstein, 1974: 347). A world-system is what Wallerstein terms a "world economy", integrated through the market rather than a political center, in which two or more regions are interdependent with respect to necessities like food, fuel, and protection, and two or more polities compete for domination without the emergence of one single center forever (Goldfrank, 2000).

In his first definition, Wallerstein (1974) said that a world-system is a "multicultural territorial division of labor in which the production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials are necessary for the everyday life of its inhabitants." This division of labor refers to the forces and relations of production of the world economy as a whole and it leads to the existence of two interdependent regions: core and periphery. These are geographically and culturally different, one focusing on labor-intensive, and the other on capital-intensive production. (Goldfrank, 2000). The core-periphery relationship is structural, semi-peripheral states act as a buffer zone between core and periphery, and has a mix of the kinds of activities and institutions that exist on them (Skocpol, 1977). The theory explains that the interaction between countries of the world has an input and output outcome in the political systems of the countries involved. Wallerstein rejected the concepts of the sovereign state and national society as constituting a social system. To him, the only social system is the world-system (Roxborough, 1981: 51). This world-system, to him, is essentially a capitalist system, which forms a network in which productive activities in one part of the system have implications for the other. disparity in terms of trade and development between China and her African allies when using a lens in examining their ties especially with Cameroon goes a long way to indicate that China is acting as a neocolonial state and her public utterances against certain states indicate her capitalist agenda.

The critics of this theory have x-rayed the cons of the capitalist agenda under which China is operating. The lack of the transfer of technology and the inequality in terms of development of infrastructure, trade and financial transactions paint a devilish picture of the world system theory of Wallerstein. A strength of this theory can rest on the fact that it is speeding up the juicy elements in fostering globalization and it has given birth to other theories which have emerged to either counteract, support, or completely present a

divergent explanation of global affairs ranging from political, economic and socio-culturally.

The Quest for Oil and other Natural Resources

Muyo (2012: 65 cited Idun-Arhurst and Liang (2008: 2) by stating that, driven by its desperate need to find oil and industrial raw materials and its search for new export markets, China has turned to Africa, which boasts vast natural resources, including oil and gas, metal ores and cotton. Marks (2007: 25) stated that, based on current projections, Chinese demand for and consumption of mineral resources is expected to grow exponentially in the foreseeable future. So, in an attempt to diversify its sources to supply, China has set its sight on Africa as a natural partner. With these foregoing views, one would want to conclude that China's interest in Cameroon like any other African country is the exploitation of raw materials. Though not wrong, it would be faulty to conclude that this view tops the list on the chart of Chinese priorities in Cameroon as the study reveals. China is increasingly economically important for Africa, but Africa accounts for only 3% of China's international trade (Chan 2006: 18). Muyo (2011, 65-66), held that in the past Cameroon enjoyed a favourable trade balance with China until a few years ago. Indeed, Cameroon's exports to China peaked in 2000 and started a downward trend in 2001, while imports from China on the contrary have been on a steady rise. In Cameroon, the Chinese are getting involved in forest exploitation, with only three small firms at moment. Chinese presence on the African Continent is far from uniform. It can be found in places where there is a concentration of natural resources required for the economic development of China. Access to so-called strategic resources is a high priority for Beijing authorities, given that they see continued double-digit growth figures as a basic condition for maintaining their political legitimacy (Rocca, 1997: 50).

Shi (2010: 213) in African development, stresses that "the positive impact of China's presence on African development will be limited in the long run because of a huge conflict of interest between China and Africa". The authors note that the strengthening of China's presence in Africa has been fundamentally motivated by access to African natural resources (Vanessa et al., 2019: 5). China's overwhelming and progressive dominance in the continent of Africa and from her entry into an alliance with the continent of Africa and Cameroon are felt in the domain of trade and natural resources. China has been able to simultaneously cement her feet in these domains with a lot of trade deals that have been signed and sealed especially after the 2018 FOCAC Forum in Beijing.

The government is interested in maximizing the mining potential of the country, in a bid to bolster the national economy in accordance with its 2035 Development Vision. The series of economic adjustments achieved under the supervision of Bretton Woods Institutions yielded, among other things, sector-specific legal frameworks (for forestry, oil and gas, mining, etc.), established in order to attract FDI. Chinese interest in Cameroon's extractive industries has increased steadily in recent years, highlighted by Sinosteel's acquisition of the Lobé iron ore exploration permit close to Kribi in 2008, and the partnership forged in 2009 between Yan Chang Logone Development Holding Company Limited and the state-owned National Hydrocarbon Corporation (Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures – SNH) to explore for crude oil in the northern part of the country (Nguepjuo, 2017: 518).

Ready Market for Chinese Products

Muyo (2012: 67) states that in the early stages of Cameroon-China relations, established in 1971, there were only a few dozen of Chinese people in Cameroon. Large-scale migration of Chinese-business people into Cameroon began around 1995. By 2006, an estimated 1000 Chinese-business people lived in Cameroon and by 2008 their number had more than doubled. Today, the Chinese people can be spotted in nearly all of Cameroon's regions particularly in the major city centers doing all sorts of business from an informal and formal sector. The massive presence of Chinese manufactured goods and services in all sorts from electronics, food, utensils, clothes etc., in Cameroonian markets has paved the way for the acquisition of these goods by both the rich and poor because of the cheap prices thus outplaying local producers.

Socio-economic impact of Sino-Cameroon Relations on Cameroon

There is no doubt that the improved socio-economic development in Cameroon in recent decades accrue from Sino-Cameroon relations.

Infrastructural and Investment Footprints

Vanessa et al., (2019: 9) investigated that China is playing a great role in infrastructural and investment projects in Cameroon. China financed the construction of phase one of the Yaoundé-Douala highway since 2014 through a loan of 241 billion FCFA (US\$438 million) (information gotten from Mr Yameni Evariste, Director of subcontracting and partnership exchange, March 2018). Chinese first highway engineering company Limited (CFHECL) is the company responsible for the implementation of the project. He stated that the project intends to connect the economic capital of Cameroon-Douala to the political capital Yaoundé on a modern highway. The first part of the 80-kilometre length; was intended to be finished in October 2018 but due to some interruptions like workers' strikes, the work has been delayed. The road has been completed at 74% is said to be delivered by 2020. Notwithstanding this road, Exim Bank is projected to finance the construction of lodging units in Cameroon. Information gotten from Mr. Gabriel Bengono, General Manager of the Real Estate Company of Cameroon, enlightened us that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the construction of 1,500 social housing units in Cameroon was signed on April 18, 2008, in Yaoundé between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the National Society of China for Economic and Technical Cooperation of SHENYANG (ibid).

In addition to this, Cameroon has been able to carry out wide elephant projects with assistance from China and these projects act as a catalyst for the country's 2035 development vision. These projects consist of Yaoundé Multipurpose Sports Complex, Limbe and Bafoussam Stadiums, Yaounde-Nsimalen freeway, the Trans-African (Ngaoundere-Kousseri, bordering Chad) and Kumba-Mamfe Kribi-Edea highways, Kribi Deep Sea Port and Industrial Complex, the Memve'le, Mekin and Lom Pangar dam projects are all financed by Exim Bank in China among others. Ikome, (2015) stated that China also financed and constructed a 200-bed Gynaecological-Obstetrical and Pediatric Hospital in Yaoundé in 2003. China assembled and equipped another 303-bed Gynecological clinic in Douala in 2014 including other regional health centers. In 2009 Paul Biya himself inaugurated the Chinese-constructed Gynecology, Obstetrics, and Pediatrics Hospital and a multi-sport complex in Yaoundé. Chinese support to Cameroon in the health

sector has graciously improved healthcare services in including the creation of jobs in the likes of doctors, nurses, laboratory technicians, security guards, cooks and surface cleaners.

Educational Impact

One very crucial impact of Sino-Cameroon relations on Cameroon is based on the award of scholarship schemes to brilliant Cameroonian students at both secondary and tertiary levels to study in Chinese Universities via her soft power diplomacy. Scholarships are part of Sino-Cameroonian cultural and educational ties, Tambo (2019: 6) stated that in the academic year 2017/18 the Chinese government, for instance, awarded about 132 scholarships to top Cameroonian students; the grants were related to the following courses: mining, industrial fishing, medicine, accounting, finance, management and logistics, renewable energies, environmental sciences, network and telecommunication, agriculture, computer sciences, information technology, electricity, international relations, international law, Chinese language. The scholarship holders receive a monthly stipend of about 252.000 CFA (app. 380€) plus the coverage of the university fees. It is noted that cultural and educational policies are the third pillar of foreign policy away from the primary political and economic ones, educational cooperation is zoomed as a form of external relations in hands of government agencies and the Chinese Confucius Institute is spearheading that of China.

In piping, the term of soft power, the father of soft power Joseph Nye (1990: 154) purports that non-military forms of international policy implementation are based on technological advancements, education and economic power. Soft power is, therefore, the capacity to do or change something and to let this appear legitimate from the perspective of others (Nye, 1990: 167). The creation of a Chinese language center named the Confucius Institute at the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC) in alliance with the Zhejiang Normal University which began in 1996 has been tasked with the teaching of Mandarin and Chinese culture. The number of Cameroonians and Africans to be awarded with the Chinese scholarships are expected to increase emphatically in the future and China may have a soft ride in Cameroon and Africa when these graduates from Chinese universities return home.

Mass Availability and Cheap Chinese Goods

Konings (2011: 187) stated that by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, ordinary Cameroonians could afford a variety of consumer goods such as DVD players, televisions, cell phones, clothing, and shoes because of the influx of cheap imports from China; the scale of clothing imports, in particular, has been referred to as a “textiles tsunami”. In exchange, Cameroon exports cotton, timber, oil, and other vital raw materials to feed Chinese industries. The mass dumping availability of Chinese finished products in Cameroonian markets is detrimental to home industries hence forcing local industries out of business and some trying to break even just to survive economically. In major cities like Bamenda, Douala, Yaoundé, Bafoussam, Kumba among others Chinese products are flooding the markets. Amin (2019: 3) earmarked those tens of thousands of motor-bikes imported from China serve as taxis (okada, or Bendskin) and contribute to congestion in many of the nation’s urban centers. Cameroonian traditional medicines have been

overtaken by Chinese traditional medicine including puff puffing frying on the streets accompanied by cheap Chinese prostitutes in Douala and Yaoundé.

Lamenting on Sino-Cameroon relations at the infancy level, Amin (2015: 6) stated that agreements with China did not include initiatives to promote manufacturing in Cameroon. China did not transfer any form of technology to Cameroon; and made little effort to genuinely partner with Cameroonian-owned companies. Major projects in Cameroon were completed with mostly Chinese labor, both skilled and unskilled. Chinese aid was largely in the form of huge building projects such as party halls, stadiums, and other public buildings. One of the most celebrated achievements, the Yaoundé Conference Center, was formally opened in 1985, although Chinese citizens remained in Cameroon to operate machines in the hall. It should be noted that it was during Ahidjo's regime in September 1972, he promulgated a Presidential Decree No. 72/5000 in which he approved the economic and technical agreement with China. This decree approved reduced tariffs on imports and exports and made a list of goods to be imported from Chinese manufacturers and Cameroonian raw materials to China. This economic agreement ushered the continuous Sino-Cameroon relations which have culminated in huge dumping of Chinese goods in Cameroon and ruthless exploitation of raw materials from Cameroon.

Challenges China faces in Cameroon

Chinese Environmental Dishonesty and Non-Compliance Towards Cooperate Social Responsibility in Cameroon

The Chinese presence in Africa has raised many criticisms (Reisen, 2007; Woods, 2008; Walker, 2010) as concerns the modalities and consequences of its official development assistance. According to Woods (2008), Chinese aid undermines environmental and social standards, as well as the principles of good governance established by multilateral institutions. Reisen (2007) argues that China's financial processes promote corruption, undermine democracy and weaken debt tolerance. Walker and Cook (2010) denounce China's "unconditional" policy, which counteracts the pressure exerted by the international community for democracy (human rights and freedoms), the preservation of environmental (pollution) and social norms, the preservation of the ecosystem (excessive cutting of tree species), and the preservation of fauna and flora maritime (industrial fishing abusive disappearing some rare species (Vanessa et al., 2019: 5-6).

The full respect for environmental laws and the promulgation of new environmental laws by Cameroon should come into force hence all international companies be it Chinese or others must abide by it. Thus, the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection in Cameroon should enact environmental management systems that seeks to protect the environment and punish international defaulters. Moreso, Chinese companies must adhere to the cooperate social responsibility rules and regulations of Cameroon to better those communities whose raw materials are been extracted.

When it comes to treating the dumping palaver of Chinese goods and services in Cameroon and Africa as a whole, there is an urgent need for the government of Cameroon to put in place mechanisms that will promote and protect home industries especially those at the infancy stage with tax exemptions for a certain number of years, loans and to check

that just the necessary products shipped from China into the country are allowed. This will go a long way to reduce youth unemployment, expand small and medium-size enterprises at home and more importantly payment of taxes to the state

Conclusions. China's high contact with the continent of Africa and Cameroon is symbolic, it is accompanied by different phases with pros and cons. Though the relationship is complex with a lot of secrecy from the part of the Chinese, it has developmental patterns in Cameroon. In the 1980s, Sino-African economic relations were tailored on the recognition of China which took the form of technical support from Beijing in the construction of infrastructure. Chinese moves into Africa and Cameroon isn't for generosity however Beijing's ego is to speed and complete Chinese industrialization through the acquisition of cheap raw materials and markets. The new adage that "Africa is the world's best next destination", means that any state with healthy relations in Africa will have a grip of the natural resources and markets. African States including Cameroon are benefiting gigantically with Chinese presence.

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Бюлент АЗМА, професор, д.е.н., Університет Анадола,

Економічний факультет, завідувач кафедри економі

Теканг П. Квачух, доктор філософії, Університет Анадола,

факультет політології та міжнародних відносин

ЕКСПАНСІОНІЗМ КИТАЮ ЗА МЕЖАМИ АЗІЇ: ПОШУКИ ПРИРОДНИХ РЕСУРСІВ ТА РИНКІВ ЗБУТУ В АФРИЦІ НА ПРИКЛАДІ КАМЕРУНУ.

Закінчення воєн і холодної війни ознаменувало новий вимір і народження нових і другорядних гравців на міжнародній арені. Китай є одним з таких новачків у світлі ламп 21-го століття, чії відносини з Африканським континентом зростають не по днях, а по годинах. Китайські зовнішньополітичні плани втілюються у життя завдяки взаємному співробітництву між державами, що розвиваються за межами Азії, а його статус наддержави, що формується, знаходиться на підйомі. Пекінська декларація 2000 року супроводжувалася колосальним розвитком китайсько-африканського співробітництва (FOCAC) у сфері економічного і соціального розвитку. Пошук сировини, енергоресурсів і ринків збуту для китайської промисловості, що бурхливо розвивається, підштовхнув Китай до шаленого поспіху в Африці і, зокрема, в Камеруні. У цій роботі досліджуються причини китайського інтересу до Африки з особливим акцентом на Камеруні. Крім того, в ній дається оцінка соціально-економічного впливу китайсько-камерунських зв'язків, і, нарешті, розглядаються проблеми, з якими стикається Китай в Камеруні, намагаючись підтримувати свій економічний інтерес на належному рівні. Тут використовується теорія світової системи, аналіз якої зосереджується на відносинах між ядром і периферією. Поглиблення і асиметричний дисбаланс у цих відносинах на користь Китаю викликали дебати в академічних колах і серед політиків як на континенті, так і за його межами, дехто розглядає Китай як замасковану неоколоніальну державу, що стоїть в одному ряду з іншими капіталістичними державами, оскільки економічна проповідь про "безпрограшність", яку проповідує Китай, - це фарс, в якому Китай отримує жирний виграш.

Ключові слова: Африка, Азія, Китай, Камерун, експансіонізм, природні ресурси, ринки.